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e In 2007 the Australian wine industry is at a crossroads, both organizationally and 
culturally. Having achieved considerable success over the past three decades, the indus- 
try is now operating in the shadow of that success. Rather than adapting to new and 
multiple operating pathways of a global wine landscape, industry organizations con- 
tinue to steer their sector along the entrenched and restrictive pathways of previous 
achievement. 
e This  paper examines strategies that have locked the industry into a saturated, price- 
sensitive, commodity wine market. It explains how these strategies will inherently fail 
to address current challenges and opportunities, and based on empirical data, why a 
differentiated, region-specific approach to wine production is the most likely strategy for 
survival. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: development over the 
past decade 
 
Over the past decade the Australian  wine 
industry has undergone profound  changes. 
Most of these  changes have resulted from the 
industry’s organizational responses to global 
wine trends. This paper will assess the effec- 
tiveness of these  responses and  their  causal 
link with  the industry’s current status as a 
commodity wine  supplier. It will also question 
strategies now being undertaken to address  an 
on-going wine  surplus and how more effective 
strategies could  be implemented. 
By the mid-1990s  the Australian  wine  indus- 
try  had  cemented its  global  reputation as  a 
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leader  in the New World’s ‘new wave’ of inno- 
vative  wine  producers. A bold  vision  as well 
as a reconfiguration of infrastructure, resources, 
marketing and R&D was  rapidly changing the 
sector’s status from that of a domestic cottage 
industry to a respected participant in inter- 
national markets. The organizational model 
behind  this  transition was  one  of centraliza- 
tion.  At the  hub  of the  new  model  was  the 
Grape and Wine Research and Development 
Corporation (GWRDC), which was  mandated 
with  the responsibility of levy collection from 
producers, establishing R&D priorities and 
funding  those priorities from the levies  and 
matching government dollars.  Other  national 
bodies   such   as  the  Winemakers  Federation 
of Australia (WFA), the Australian  Wine and 
Brandy Corporation (AWBC), the Australian 
Wine Export Council  (AWEC) and the Coop- 
erative Research Centre for Viticulture (CRCV) 
 
 
  
 
were  also   crucial  participants  in  the   new 
model (Aylward, 2006; Australian Wine Online, 
2007;  GWRDC, 2007). Together, they  rede- 
fined the organizational parameters of the 
industry and established an innovative culture 
from  which global  growth targets   could  be 
met and exceeded. 
In terms of growing both export volume and 
markets, the strategy was  an unparalleled 
success. By  the  end  of  the  millennium, the 
Australian wine industry hosted approximately 
1300   producers and  ranked   as  the  world’s 
fourth   largest   exporter  with   an  income  of 
close  to  $1.5  billion  per  annum  (Winetitles, 
2001). It also dominated the popular–premium 
markets in both  the  UK and  the  USA, with  a 
large  number of best-selling wines being  Aus- 
tralian.  In addition, the industry’s reputation 
grew  as a ‘high-tech’ producer of technically 
faultless  wine, a legacy of the Australian  Wine 
Research Institute. Such success was reflected 
in imitations by other  New World  producers, 
including South Africa, Chile and Argentina. It 
was also reflected in the technology transfer 
from Australia to other producing countries in 
the   form  of  direct   foreign   investment  and 
‘flying  winemakers’, and in the acquisition 
desirability of Australian producers (Anderson, 
2004). Rationalization of the global wine indus- 
try had begun  and Australian  companies were 
highly  sought  after targets. 
Australia and fellow New World wine pro- 
ducers had  successfully implemented a strat- 
egy  of supplying  fruit-driven, consistent and 
pleasant-tasting wine  to a growing market  of 
occasional drinkers. It was  a market  that 
accepted multi-region blending of the product. 
It was a market  that was not overly concerned 
with  a product ‘story’  or its heritage, as long 
as  there  was  reliable quality at  a reasonable 
price. It was also, however, a market  that was 
being  educated by producers and over time 
would  only become more sophisticated and 
discerning in its product choice. 
 
 
Success and  path dependency 
 
A  closer   appraisal  of  these   organizational 
trends    and   developments   uncovers   some 
worrying elements. As predicted by theorists 
such  as Hannan and Freeman  (1984), paths of 
success often become entrenched to an extent 
that ‘dependency’ is established. Organiza- 
tional behaviour follows  familiar  routes  and 
patterns, rather than experimenting in alterna- 
tive domains. DiMaggio and Powell  (1991) are 
more  forceful  in their  analysis  by referring to 
this  path  dependency as  the  ‘iron   cage   of 
inertia’. Their  argument rests  on  the  theory 
that past success creates rigid parameters (the 
iron cage)  of behaviour that constrict alterna- 
tive  action  to a level  where forms  of inertia 
emerge and develop. Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996) follow  the same contention — that the 
behavioural environment, with its cultural and 
operational patterns, applies an architectural 
‘straightjacket’ to organizations. 
In such an environment, alternative archi- 
tectural frameworks may expose organizations 
to cultural isolation  and a greater risk of mor- 
tality.  Regardless of the theoretical variations, 
it is well  noted  that past success within indus- 
try sectors  creates a degree of risk aversion 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991;   Ruef,  2004). As organizations 
and other  stakeholders adhere to pathways of 
successful behaviour, they gain security and 
recognition from  those  pathways. Familiarity 
and a track  record  of success provide  natural 
barriers to future  divergence. Even as the 
external  environment  changes  and   installs 
new  challenges and opportunities, organiza- 
tions remain  reluctant to alter  existing behav- 
iour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Adaptability, 
therefore, is increasingly stifled, allowing orga- 
nizational parameters to become more embed- 
ded. Eventually, a culture of inertia  envelopes 
the operating landscape and once-successful 
strategies can no longer  align with  new,  more 
sophisticated requirements. Such  inertia  also 
has severe  consequences for most forms of 
differentiation, a concept that will be expanded 
upon  later  in this paper. 
Within   the   Australian   wine   industry the 
‘dichotomous’ relationship between past 
success and current path dependency falls 
clearly within the theoretical frameworks of 
organizational change and inertia. Particularly 
  
 
throughout the 1990s,  the dominance of Aus- 
tralian  wine  in major international markets 
confirmed the  industry’s  benchmarks  of 
success, but also led to a further  tightening of 
its  operational  parameters.  The  success  in 
these  markets was  occurring in very  specific 
price  points — the popular–premium or ‘com- 
modity’  sector, where the average bottle price 
ranged  between $US3 and  $US10.  Australian 
exports in the  super-premium and icon  price 
points  fluctuated only  between slight  growth 
and stagnation. The industry was yet to achieve 
the recognition for the ‘fine wines’ that would 
allow  it to break  into these  categories. 
Rather than broadening its benchmarks to 
incorporate other  price  categories and quality 
definitions, however, the industry remained 
focused  almost exclusively on the commodity 
sector. The official position remained that this 
was  the  sector  offering  highest revenue 
growth,  despite  the   fact  that   profits   were 
already under  pressure and  competition was 
moving  towards price  and away  from product 
(Eales and Binkley, 2003). By its own  criteria 
the industry continued to achieve, and at least 
superficially, world  markets continued to 
confirm  this  achievement. While  sales  from 
Old World  producers such  as France,  Spain, 
Italy  and  Portugal  were subject to increasing 
pressure  in  their   traditional  markets,  New 
World ‘innovators’ such as Australia continued 
to expand their  geographic reach  and satura- 
tion (Anderson, 2004;  Aylward, 2006). 
Subtle  warning signs  began   to  emerge in 
2002,  when  export volume  and export value 
indices diverged for the first time  in almost  a 
decade. CEOs from the  industry’s national 
organizations identified the ‘exponential 
growth’ in winery numbers as the main culprit. 
Their  claim  was  that  the  rapid  influx  of new 
and largely inexperienced vintners was  the 
primary cause  of an increasing grape  supply 
and the consequent pressure on prices. Their 
argument followed that  only  the  new,   rela- 
tively    inefficient   producers   would    suffer 
from  this  over-supply and  that  any  financial 
‘casualties’ would   be  part  of  the  industry’s 
self-regulation (WFA, GWRDC, AWBC, 2006). 
Such interpretations were only partially correct 
and could be attributed more to an entrenched 
‘national-set’ perspective than  to an accurate 
reading of the situation. The problem was not 
that   there   were  too  many   producers,  but 
rather,  that   too   many   of  these   producers 
were sacrificing traditional, differentiated 
approaches to compete in the  price-sensitive 
commodity sector. 
This was in line with the strong and continu- 
ing  encouragement by industry organizations 
to adhere to the ‘Brand Australia’  image 
(GWRDC, 2007). The multi-region production, 
the  R&D, the  marketing and  the  distribution 
were focused  on selling  the world  an Austra- 
lian product. It was a generic branding which 
necessarily undermined a product, regional 
and, most importantly, cultural differentiation. 
The industry’s organizational framework, as 
mandated under  its 2025  vision,  and the 
multinationals that dominated its landscape, 
demanded a national, undifferentiated  frame- 
work.  Industry  responses to divergent export 
volume    and   value,    therefore,  were   more 
closely linked  to the resources and infrastruc- 
ture  already underpinning this  national  strat- 
egy than to the notion of an over-populated 
industry. 
 
 
Cultivating path  dependency 
 
In  2007,    the   industry’s  responses  remain 
largely unchanged. What  has  been  added  is 
the  official  statement  that  the  international 
wine  industry is cyclical and  Australia  is just 
one  of many  producers experiencing a glut. 
The industry expects this surplus to rebalance 
into equal  supply and demand  within several 
years.  In fact, the past five years,  from 2002  to 
2007,  offer a detailed case history of cultivated 
path dependency in the Australian wine sector. 
In  2007  its  supply and  demand   equation is 
even more unbalanced. Export volumes  are 
steadily increasing, while value  per  unit  con- 
tinues  to decline. In March 2007,  Ari Sharp 
reported that  in the  year  to February  export 
volumes   leapt   11%  but  price   per   unit   fell 
another  6% to $A3.69 per litre. The trend looks 
set to continue, with  the Australian  Bureau  of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) 
  
 
outlook  predicting $A3 a litre by 2011 (Supply 
Chain Review, 2007). Further, ‘more than 80% 
of the volume  growth in Australia’s  wine 
exports is in  bulk  rather  than  bottled  form’. 
Sharp  (2007) continues his  report  by  stating 
that   in  the   USA  and   UK,  which  together 
account for  66%  of  Australian   exports, the 
wine  sells  primarily at the  ‘cheap end  of the 
market’ (79% at less than $A5 per bottle). 
Data from the national survey  of 100 winer- 
ies, upon which this paper  is based,  will show 
quite clearly that this situation is not the result 
of a cyclical over-supply of grapes. Rather,  it 
is a consequence of the industry’s reliance on 
a saturated, price-sensitive commodity sector 
to  which  the  Australian   wine   industry  has 
largely been relegated. There are, in fact, price 
sectors  in the industry where, for more than a 
decade, demand  has exceeded supply. Simply 
put, these sectors have never experienced a 
surplus. The survey  data  will  show  that  pro- 
ducers operating at these  higher  price  points 
remain unable to meet demand, and as a result, 
price  per unit continues to increase. Their 
success can be attributed largely to differ- 
entiation. Yet throughout much  of their 
operating history  these  producers have  been 
culturally isolated  in an industry that subordi- 
nates R&D, resources and infrastructure to the 
demands of ‘Brand Australia’  and its servicing 
of the commodity sector. 
The Australian  wine  industry today is at a 
critical stage in its development. It can remain 
dependent upon   previous  paths   of  success 
that no longer  align with  global  requirements, 
or it can re-align  to the multidimensional, dif- 
ferentiated operating paradigm that is revolu- 
tionizing the  Bordeaux wine  industry and  to 
which New World producers such  as New 
Zealand   have   successfully  adapted  (Barker 
et al., 2001;  Echikson,  2004). The first option 
outlines the practical application of Hannan 
and  Freeman’s (1984)  celebrated inertia 
theory. It will mean a continued dominance of 
policy by individuals and organizations whose 
operating mandate was  established at a time 
when  the industry was still in its adolescence. 
In organizational terms,  it will  mean the 
continued   adherence   to   a   ‘national   set- 
perspective’, in which external environmental 
influences are  peripheral rather  than  central 
to the industry’s decision-making (Narula  and 
Zanfei,  2005).  And  most  obviously,  it  will 
mean  a return  to the late 1970s,  when  Austra- 
lia’s  reputation  was   based   on  its  ability   to 
supply world  markets with  cheap, bulk  wine 
more efficiently than any of its peers  (Beeston, 
1994). While  such  a return  would  forfeit  the 
industry’s capacity and potential for competi- 
tive advantage across all price  points,  it would 
indeed satisfy the requirements of a risk-averse, 
path-dependent environment. 
The second  option  requires a ‘global  set- 
perspective’ or what  organizational scholars 
might term an organizational ecology per- 
spective (Trist, 1983;  Astley, 1984,  1985). This 
allows  for a recognition and acceptance of the 
changing global  wine  landscape, and a recon- 
figuration  of  operating  domains,  in  which 
focus is shifted  from national frameworks and 
priorities  to  the  more   flexible  contours  of 
region-specific production, distribution and 
marketing (Croser, 2004). In short, the second 
option  requires a cultural, even  anthropologi- 
cal  embrace of the  product’s vitality, variety 
and  differentiated properties (Wilson, 2004; 
Johnson,  2006). 
 
 
Why  differentiation? 
 
In their examination of the New Zealand wine 
industry, Barker  et al. (2001) emphasize the 
inextricable link  between differentiation and 
quality, a paradigm based  on product rather 
than  price  competition. They  argue  that  in a 
differentiated environment, ‘quality becomes 
(the)  predominant discourse of knowledge 
creation’ (p. 207)  and further,  that ‘discourses 
of quality (are)  linked  to place’ (p. 215). 
Schamel  (2003) applies this same architectural 
analysis  to the  Californian wine  industry, and 
again claims that a ‘lesson is the clear trend 
towards greater regional differentiation which 
also  suggests consumers are  becoming more 
discerning’ (p.  8).  The survey  findings  in this 
paper  will show that the majority  of Australia’s 
smaller  wine  producers also  believe strongly 
in the benefits  of regional differentiation. 
  
 
Croser  (2004) applies differentiation theory 
to a sector  analysis  by claiming that the wine 
industry should  be thought about  and  opera- 
tionalized as two distinct sectors. He contends 
that there is, and should always be, a commod- 
ity  sector   that  is  largely the  domain  of  the 
large  corporation, capable of operating across 
several  continents and distributing large 
volumes  of product to mass markets. Equally, 
however, he argues  that wine  industries need 
to cultivate a fine wine  sector  that operates in 
parallel with  the commodity sector, but deliv- 
ers small quantities of highly  differentiated 
products from highly  differentiated regions to 
discerning markets. Perhaps  Wilson  (2004) 
captures the  variable  frameworks of differen- 
tiation  most eloquently when  he states  that 
 
. . . the process of differentiation in which 
alcohol and its consumption are so impor- 
tant are themselves processes of globaliza- 
tion, in that they involve the recognition 
that some things, and some behaviours, 
set us apart from others in the world . . . 
(p. 2) 
 
This statement, of course, refers  to a differen- 
tiation  not just of the product, but of its entire 
cultural fabric.  Differentiation ranges  from the 
grape  variety  selected, to the  single-vineyard 
planting techniques, to the harvesting methods, 
the vinification, the regional identification, the 
distribution, the marketing and finally,  the 
consumption. It is the protection of the prod- 
uct’s identity in every step of this supply chain 
that  separates  it  and  its  heritage  from  the 
rest  of the  market  (Beverland, 2005;  Taplin, 
2006). 
 
 
The Bordeaux example 
 
The culture of differentiation is the most 
obvious  in the prestigious wine  regions of the 
Old World.  It is in regions such  as Bordeaux 
that wine  has become rooted in the very fabric 
of daily  life.  The  region’s Left Bank  is popu- 
lated  by the  centuries-old chateaux that  have 
provided France  with  its  fine  wine   identity. 
These  include the  aristocratic first  growths 
such as Chateaux Latour, Rothschild and Haut 
Brion,  but  also  the  second, third,  fourth  and 
even  fifth growths, to the  Right  Bank, where 
the boutique, highly  specialized garage wines 
have   generated  cult   followings  (Echiksen, 
2004). These two very distinct classes of wine- 
maker   and   product  can   co-exist   with   the 
20,000 other  producers of fine, premium, 
popular and  bulk  wine  precisely  because  of 
the  region’s highly  differentiated framework. 
In terms of organization, region and operation, 
the wine  and its makers  in Bordeaux promote 
very distinct identities. As Kramer (2007) 
contends, 
 
Real wine . . . comes from continuity, from 
a place, from people committed to nurtur- 
ing their vineyards and local wine cul- 
tures (p. 2) 
 
The avid protection of these  identities has 
created the  strength of branding that  has  so 
far evaded  New  World  wine  industries, with 
the exception of New Zealand. 
Across  a global  landscape of wine  produc- 
tion  and  consumption, it  is  the  differentia- 
tion — the  contours in the  landscape — that 
allow  the industry to evolve. Without  these 
contours, patterns of behaviour remain  static, 
there  is little expansion of organizational 
parameters and finally,  what  Hugh Johnson 
(2006) describes as ‘. . . charisma in a bottle’ 
becomes a pleasant but  bland,  multi-regional 
product mix. By allowing multinationals to 
dominate policy and by following a multi- 
regional blending strategy, the Australian  wine 
industry is in danger  of occupying an increas- 
ingly  featureless reserve of  the  global   land- 
scape  (Kramer,  2007). The 2006/7 study upon 
which  this  paper   is  based   highlighted  this 
danger  and contrasted it sharply with  the ben- 
efits of greater differentiation. 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This paper  was developed in two phases. The 
first phase was based upon extensive literature 
reviews concerning: 
  
 
1.  The Australian and international wine indus- 
tries  and  discordant developments within 
these  industries over the past decade. In 
particular, reviews were conducted within 
the context of the transition from an under- 
supply of wine  grapes  in the late  1990s  to 
the  current over-supply. Specific attention 
was focused  on the emerging response 
strategies to this transition, how these strat- 
egies   differ  and  which appear to  be  the 
more  effective. 
2.  Organizational change,  path   dependency 
and differentiation within industry sectors. 
This review was  concerned primarily with 
placing the wine  industry within a context 
of radical change over a relatively short 
period  of time.  These changes and their 
responses were viewed in light of the dom- 
inant  organizational change theories and 
underpinned the framework for the survey 
in phase  two. 
 
In addition  to reviews, the structure of the 
current paper  emerged from  consistent find- 
ings  within the  author’s previous studies  on 
the  wine   industry. These  findings   provided 
what   the  author   believes is  a  cohesive set 
of indicators suggesting a seismic shift in 
operating  paradigms and  a  subsequent lack 
of organizational adaptation by industry 
stakeholders. 
Phase  two  of  the  study  was  the  develop- 
ment and implementation of a survey designed 
around   these   themes. The  intention of  the 
survey  was  to test  the  organizational change 
and inertia  themes among boutique, small and 
medium-sized  firms   in  the   context  of  the 
current wine  grape  surplus. In parallel, the 
survey  was designed to ‘unpack’ notions  of 
differentiation and  contrast the  practice  of 
this differentiation with  the industry’s current 
operating framework. 
Of the 112 firms approached, a total of 100 
boutique, small and medium-sized wine  opera- 
tors agreed to be interviewed by phone. These 
firms were selected using  a stratified  random 
sampling technique.  Four  states   were  cov- 
ered — New South Wales, Victoria,  South Aus- 
tralia  and  Western Australia — and  care  was 
taken  to ensure all the major  wine  regions in 
these  states were equally represented. In addi- 
tion,  there  was  careful  sampling according to 
size, so that boutique, small and medium-sized 
firms were equally represented. Only export- 
ing  firms  were  included and  in  each   case, 
either  the CEO or the Marketing Manager  was 
interviewed. 
The survey  questions were primarily de- 
signed   for  Likert-scale   responses  (1–5)   but 
were also supplemented with  open-ended, 
qualitative questions. These qualitative ques- 
tions  were designed to ‘unpack’ some  of the 
more detailed questions concerning respon- 
dent thought on branding, regionalization, 
effectiveness of R&D extension and individual 
operational strategies. 
 
 
Findings 
 
A key hypothesis of this paper  is that differen- 
tiation  allows  for competition of product, 
rather  than  of price. In product competition 
the price  sensitivity is reduced if not removed 
altogether.  The  argument  follows   that   the 
more   a  producer  is   able   to   compete  on 
product,  the   less   prices  are   affected   by  a 
surplus of that  product and,  therefore, the 
higher  the profit margin of that product 
(Benfratello et al., 2004;  Kaniovski,  2005). 
In  this   context,  survey   questions placed 
the  concept of differentiation in  contrast to 
the Australian  wine  industry’s response to the 
current surplus. Wine producers were asked a 
series   of  questions about  the  effect   of  this 
surplus on their operations and strategies they 
had implemented as a response. The answers 
provided some  very  clear  indicators of deci- 
sion-making as well  as a snapshot of two com- 
peting and rather  contradictory strategies. 
 
 
The current wine surplus and  its effect 
on  operations 
 
Responses to this first issue set parameters for 
the remainder of the survey. All 100 wine  pro- 
ducers were asked  how  the  current surplus 
was  affecting the  viability of their  operations 
(see  Table 1). 
  
 
Table 1. Impact  of wine  surplus on firm operations (n = 100) 
 
Degree  of impact  on operations                                                   Percentage 
 
No impact                                                                                                     23% 
Slight impact                                                                                                 34% 
Moderate  impact                                                                                          24% 
Significant impact                                                                                         12% 
Threatening survival                                                                                      7% 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Association between effect  of wine  surplus and export status — firm categories 
 
Impact  of wine  surplus Export value  status  Percentage of firms 
 
 
No impact  (23%) 
 
Export value  fallen 
 
4% 
 Export value  unaffected 48% 
 Export value  increased 26% 
Slight negative impact  (34%) Moderate  fall in export value 21% 
 Export value  unaffected 65% 
 Export value  increased 9% 
Moderately negative impact  (24%) Significant fall in export value 50% 
 Export value  unaffected 25% 
 Export value  increased 16% 
Significant negative impact  (12%) Significant fall in export value 67% 
 Export value  unaffected 17% 
 Export value  increased 0% 
Threatens survival  (7%) Significant fall in export value 43% 
 Export value  unaffected 29% 
 Export value  increased 14% 
 
 
 
As shown  in Table 1, there  was  a relatively 
even distribution across the impact  categories. 
If responses are grouped into ‘little or no 
impact’ and ‘moderate to severe impact’ we 
see  that currently 43% of survey  respondents 
are experiencing real difficulties as a result  of 
the  wine   surplus. The  figure  certainly  indi- 
cates  that at an industry level,  a large  percent- 
age of boutique, small and medium-sized firms 
are  experiencing  moderate to  severe   prob- 
lems. This hypothesis is reinforced by Pia 
Akerman (2007) in The Australian, who claims 
that the majority  of Australian  wineries are 
currently unprofitable and Chris Byrne (2006), 
who stated recently on the ABC that as a wine 
producer ‘we are receiving about 30–35, in 
some cases maybe 40  cents, in a $10  bottle 
of wine’. 
The issue,  however, becomes more interest- 
ing when  we  disaggregate the impact  catego- 
ries and use them  as the basis for comparison 
with  other  variables. For example, of the 23% 
who stated that there  was ‘no impact’ on their 
operations, only  one  operator  claimed  that 
their  export value  had  fallen  (by  10%) in the 
past 12 months. Of the remaining, 48% claimed 
that export value  had not been  affected  while 
26% claimed their export value  had actually 
increased by 10–15% in the  past  12  months. 
Five respondents did not answer the question. 
For firms in this category there  is a clear  asso- 
ciation  between their resilience to the wine 
surplus and the continued success of their 
exports. From the following tables,  the reader 
can see the continuity of this relationship 
between each  category of impact  and export 
status. 
Table 2 demonstrates that for survey  re- 
spondents there  is a proportionate association 
between the negative impact  of wine  surplus 
  
 
Table 3.  Association between impact  of surplus and export price  points 
 
 
Impact  category 
 
Average  FOB price  per case 
 
No impact 
 
$212 
Slight negative impact $114 
Moderate  negative impact $109 
Significant negative impact $92 
Threatening survival $84 
 
 
 
 
on  firm  operations  and  the   value   of  their 
exports.  While   firms   that   experienced   no 
impact from the surplus demonstrated unaf- 
fected  or increased export value,  those  firms 
that experienced a moderate to significant 
negative impact  from the surplus also experi- 
enced a  moderate  to  significant  fall  in  the 
value  of their  exports. This relationship  sug- 
gests   that  there   is,  in  fact,  a  causal   effect 
between impact  on operations and the ability 
to extract export value  from products. 
 
 
The relationship between price points, 
differentiation and  competitive 
advantage 
 
It is a causal  effect  that  becomes even  more 
prominent when  the  export FOB prices are 
examined. Firms were asked  to identify  the 
average price  points  they  targeted in export 
markets, with  the  responses being  measured 
against  the original  ‘categories of impact’. The 
results  (as shown  in Tables 2 and 3) confirm 
a clear  association between resilience to the 
wine   surplus, export  value   and  the  export 
price  points  into which the product is sold. 
What is also represented in these  data is the 
probable  cause   and  effect   between  export 
price    category — commodity,   premium   or 
icon — and   resilience  to  an  industry wine 
surplus. As one of the respondents, an iconic 
producer, typically stated  when  asked  about 
the effect  of the surplus: 
 
What surplus? There is certainly no surplus 
at the prices points I sell at. I’m  struggling 
to meet the demand. Business has never 
been better. 
This was  reinforced by another  premium pro- 
ducer  who  insisted that 
 
We  will never escape the effects of this 
surplus while we continue to lower our 
prices. There is a wine lake out there and 
we have to resist joining it. 
 
At the  other  end  of the  spectrum, those  pro- 
ducers feeling  most threatened by the surplus 
were responding by  lowering their  export 
prices even  further.  In many  cases  producers 
admitted that this was largely an act of des- 
peration, to avoid leaving  grapes  on the vine, 
but it also highlights the extent to which the 
‘commodity culture’ has become entrenched 
among  lower-end producers. 
The mere fact that those respondents selling 
at the highest price  points  were also the ones 
feeling   no  impact   from  the   surplus, while 
those feeling  most negative impact  were those 
selling  at the  lowest price  points,  lends  con- 
siderable weight to the paper’s hypothesis. 
Further,  it provides a cauterizing  snapshot of 
the  landscape that  the  Australian  wine  indus- 
try now  traverses. As the respondent claimed, 
there  is a global  wine  lake  of blended, undif- 
ferentiated, mass-produced product. It is not 
dissimilar to the  commodity-style markets for 
bread,   milk   or  soft-drink   products.  Supply 
is exceeding demand, price  competition is 
intense, there  is  little  difference in  product 
taste  and  for small  producers, profit  margins 
are unsustainably low.  Over the past 15 years 
the Australian wine market has grown to a 
dominant position in this wine  lake,  but with 
this position has come the ‘iron cage of inertia’. 
Parameters  have   become  rigid   and   in   its 
  
 
current  configuration  the   industry  has  left 
itself little  flexibility. 
The ‘iron cage’  is particularly relevant to the 
smaller  and medium producers. In the  1990s 
these  producers ‘piggy-backed’ on the export 
drive  of Australia’s  wine  multinationals. They 
were led into a global  market  that was  thirsty 
for this new, technically faultless product from 
the New World. The benefit to the smaller 
producers was immediate and significant. 
Within    several    years    their    markets   had 
increased substantially in geographic spread, 
number and volume. They began  to sell more 
and more of their product abroad and so even- 
tually  restructured the  product and  the  taste 
to the  requirements of a less  discerning, less 
interested   international   customer   (Croser, 
2004,  2006). 
It was, however, a market  that multinational 
wine  producers always had, and continued to, 
dominate. The smaller  producers occupied a 
tiny proportion of this market  and as more of 
them flooded it in their liquid ‘gold rush’ the 
supply became bloated, and accordingly, 
returns began  to shrink.  A critical marker  in 
the  fortunes  of these  smaller  producers was 
the period  in which their  exports overtook 
domestic  sales.   Their  traditional customers, 
who demanded and paid for a wine  of distinc- 
tion based  on single  vineyard grape  selection 
with  strong  regional characteristics and hand- 
crafted  attention, were increasingly sacrificed 
to the bland demands of commodity-style 
drinkers in the UK and USA. The smaller  firms 
were never going to match the mass plantings, 
distribution channels and marketing influence 
of their  multinational ‘mentors’. But unfortu- 
nately, they  were beginning to  match  their 
character-free wine  styles. 
In 2007,  the  Australian   wine   landscape is 
largely without contours. It is a landscape that, 
while still inhabitable by Australian  and inter- 
national corporations, is increasingly hostile to 
the  smaller, now  undifferentiated producer. 
Through  its R&D extension, centralized 
decision-making, preference  for  multi-region 
blending and a marketing campaign of ‘Brand 
Australia’, the  industry has  locked itself  into 
the commodity-style pathway. But as with  the 
corner grocer   who  can  no  longer   compete 
against giant super and hyper-markets, Austra- 
lia’s 1900  small wine  producers are no longer 
viable  participants in this commodity sector. 
Like their  French  counterparts in Bordeaux 
or their New World rivals in New Zealand and 
the Napa and Sonoma regions of California, 
Australia’s  small  producers must  return  to  a 
path  of greater differentiation and  regionally 
focused  identity if they  are  to create sustain- 
able  futures.   In  fact,  among  survey   respon- 
dents  91% argued  that regional differentiation 
of product, identity and culture was intricately 
linked  to an enhanced reputation for wine 
quality. Other recent data support such a strat- 
egy.  A snapshot of the  Bordeaux garagistes 
and their product sales reveals  that their small- 
batch,  hand-crafted products continue to sell 
out in futures  trading  (2 years  before  they  are 
even  bottled) at a price  of up to 6000  euros  a 
case,  despite a continued global  wine  surplus 
(Echikson,  2004). 
Similarly, producers from New Zealand’s 
Marlborough region  command record  prices 
for their  wine, while the  New  Zealand  wine 
sector, as a whole, is the only New World 
industry where demand  is still greater than 
supply. Its 1990s strategy of targeting premium 
and ultra-premium price  points  appears to be 
paying substantial dividends. The latest figures 
from California  also provide  strong  indication 
that selling into the higher, differentiated price 
points  is the optimum strategy. In April 2007, 
Bloomberg revealed that  US exports (95% 
derived from California) had ‘soared 30% in 
value’  while only increasing 4% in volume, 
almost a complete reversal of Australia’s March 
2007  figures  where exports increased only 4% 
in value  and  11% in volume, an effective 7% 
decrease in value  (Mariani, 2007). 
In order  for this strategy of greater differen- 
tiation  to develop, however, there  must be an 
industry-led acknowledgement  of the  emerg- 
ing and radically different operational para- 
digm.  The Australian  industry must unlock  its 
priorities from  the  single-sector perspective 
that  it  has  adhered to  over  the  past  three 
decades. It must undertake the essential recon- 
figuration  of  product  manufacturing,  R&D, 
  
 
identity, branding and  marketing that  is now 
required  by   the   dual-sector  approach  that 
other New and Old World industries are imple- 
menting so successfully. 
Until now,  the industry has remained reluc- 
tant to focus  on a second  and parallel sector, 
perceiving it  instead   as  a  threat  to  its 
dominance of the commodity market. To 
organizational scientists this reluctance is 
understandable and  expected. The  industry 
has built its success on a one-dimensional, one- 
sector  approach and through that success has 
locked itself into risk-averse  strategies that will 
deliver ‘more  of the same’.  This short-term 
security, however, is at the expense of longer- 
term   adaptability  and   survival.   As  demon- 
strated  by survey  respondents and by isolated 
innovators across  the  Australian  wine  indus- 
try, there  is growing demand  outside  the com- 
modity wine sector and that demand has the 
capacity to absorb  the  supplies of Australia’s 
smaller  producers. 
 
 
Rebuilding competitive advantage 
 
In an environment in which the  demand  for 
$212   cases   outstrips supply,  yet  $84   cases 
(Table  3)  can  no  longer   attract   buyers, the 
current operating paradigm is clearly inappro- 
priate. Producers of these  $212  cases  are 
usually  highly  successful operators delivering 
a meticulously hand-crafted product with  a 
distinct heritage and strong  regional identity. 
Yet  culturally,  they   remain   isolated   within 
what  they  see  as a bland,  nationally branded 
industry. For example, when  asked  about  the 
importance of regional differentiation to their 
operations, 78% of these  producers claimed it 
was  ‘significant’ or ‘critical’, yet  74% argued 
that  there  was  no recognition of, or support 
for, this differentiation by industry bodies. 
It is argued  that  individual producers such 
as  Henschke, Vasse  Felix,  Cullens, Petaluma 
and Lake’s Folly rival the great wine  producers 
of the  world  in terms  of product quality and 
distinction. Yet they remain  as isolated  pro- 
ducers with   little   if  any  structural support. 
Their approach to the growth and production 
of  highly   differentiated  products  could,   as 
with   iconic producers in  other  wine   indus- 
tries,   be  adopted  as  an  industry template. 
Within   an  industry  that  boasts   one  of  the 
world’s best  academies  (Roseworthy),  a 
leading R&D institute (the  Australian  Wine 
Research Institute), a heritage of innovation 
and an almost  perfect growing climate, the 
potential for wines of distinction is perhaps 
without parallel. What  are  missing, however, 
are a cultural acceptance and a willingness to 
adapt.  The differentiated template is certainly 
available but  it  appears that  the  innovative 
‘spirit’ and adaptability which transformed the 
industry in the 1980s  are depleted. 
A rebuilding of the  Australian  wine  indus- 
try’s   competitive  advantage  requires  more 
than  the  current rhetoric about  regional  pri- 
orities  and understanding changing consumer 
preferences. It requires leadership from 
industry   bodies    such    as   the   Grape   and 
Wine Research Development Corporation, the 
Australian  Wine  and  Brandy  Corporation and 
the  Winemakers Federation of Australia.  This 
leadership should  be based on competitive 
advantage for each  sector  of the industry, not 
simply  those sectors  dominated by multina- 
tionals.  Specifically, this requires four major 
reconfigurations. 
 
 
Board restructures 
 
The first reconfiguration relates  to board mem- 
bership of  the  national  associations.  Boards 
of major decision-making bodies  such as the 
GWRDC, the  WFA, the  AWBC and  the  WEC 
have been  dominated by an ‘inner-circle’ of 
policy-makers. It primarily comprises CEOs of 
Australia’s   major   wine   corporations,  CEOs 
of the  organizations that  are  in  part  funded 
by these  corporations (through levies) and 
selected individuals whose thoughts on indus- 
try directions are considered ‘appropriate’.  In 
fact, it would be fair to say that the policies 
emerging  from  these   boards   over  the  past 
three decades have correlated closely with the 
economic interests of Australia’s  larger  wine 
corporations. This has in no way been brought 
about  through corrupt practices, but  simply 
through  economic   imperatives.   Since   the 
  
 
funding  of these  organizations (and industry 
R&D) comes in large part from a levy on grape 
growing and production (in tonnes  crushed), 
it is an economic fact that most of the funding 
will  be derived from the largest  producers. 
Although   some   attempt  at  democratizing 
these boards has taken place over the last two 
years,  greater representation of each  of the 
industry’s sectors  is required. This could  be 
achieved  by  expanding  board   membership 
to include a representative from each  major 
regional association. Not only  would  this 
diffuse the concentration of interests, but it 
would  also instil a regionalized culture into the 
decision-making process. Smaller and medium- 
sized  firms would  receive greater representa- 
tion through their  elected board member, but 
possibly of equal  importance, the current 
nationalized culture of resourcing and priori- 
tizing  would  gradually give  way  to a regional 
perspective. 
 
 
Levy collection 
 
In parallel with regionally representative board 
structures would be a restructured levy system. 
As mentioned, under  the  current system  and 
particularly in relation to R&D, those  who 
produce the  most pay  the  most in levies  and 
therefore, either  explicitly or implicitly, exert 
the most influence on decision-making. Again, 
assessing this system  from an organizational 
science model,  the current levy structure 
ensures a  path  dependency.  Alternative and 
innovative strategies will always be peripheral 
to those currently underwritten by the largest 
stakeholders. Change  and  adaptability, there- 
fore,  are  only  possible where benefits  to the 
larger  stakeholders are obvious.  In the Austra- 
lian  wine  industry, regional differentiation is 
not  considered beneficial to  those  corpora- 
tions that dominate the commodity sector. In 
fact, it is considered a threat. 
In order to create a truly representative levy 
system, stakeholder voting  power and R&D 
extension would  need  to be linked  to a speci- 
fied production level (tonnage), rather than an 
individual contribution. This would  allow  for 
regional cooperatives of smaller  producers to 
match  production and,  therefore, levy  levels 
of their  larger  counterparts. It would  ensure 
greater participation in the decision-making 
process  and  also  more   representative 
extension of the industry’s research and 
development. 
 
 
R&D extension to associations 
 
R&D extension within the Australian  wine 
industry is critical to a more differentiated, 
competitive sector. It was  the  national plat- 
form of R&D in the  1980s  that  provided the 
impetus and capacity for the  industry’s trans- 
formation. It will be the regionalization of this 
R&D in the new millennium that will allow the 
industry to adapt  to a multidimensional  land- 
scape  of production, distribution and market- 
ing.  R&D will  underpin any reconfiguration 
from national to regional priorities and  iden- 
tity.  It is able  to provide  the  innovation, the 
knowledge diffusion and the enhanced supply 
chains   that  individual  regions  will   need   in 
their  efforts to differentiate. 
Within  the  current, national R&D grid,  pri- 
orities  are set in South Australia.  As the hub of 
the wine  industry, this is where all national 
associations are located, where the national 
boards  meet  and consequently, where R&D 
extension policy is formulated. In 2007,  indus- 
try organizations are likely  to argue  that R&D 
extension  has   evolved  considerably.   They 
could   correctly  contend  that   a  centralized 
R&D model  has been  largely replaced by one 
based around regional extension programmes. 
Reform,   in  response  to  industry-wide  pres- 
sure,   is  indeed  taking   place. Yet  this  new 
model  will  lack  the  capacity to revitalize the 
industry unless  it is linked  to robust  and well- 
resourced regional associations. In its present 
form the  extension programmes are  still  pre- 
scribed under  centralized (South Australian) 
R&D priorities (GWRDC, 2007). 
As many respondents pointed out, the R&D 
priorities of South Australia are not necessarily 
the R&D priorities of their region. In fact, 66% 
of the  survey’s respondents claimed that  the 
industry’s current R&D framework provided 
‘little’ or  ‘no’  value  to  their  operations.  Soil 
  
 
management, canopy management, disease 
and pest control, climatic responses and grape 
variety  differ markedly from one region  to the 
next.  In short,  different regions have different 
terroirs. The current R&D framework simply 
does not account for these  variations. What is 
required for R&D flexibility and responsive- 
ness  is  a  ‘hub  and  spoke’   model,   whereby 
regional wine-makers and  grape-grower  asso- 
ciations link directly in terms  of decision- 
making  and resources to the  national bodies. 
Resourced with  R&D field officers,  propor- 
tionate  funds as collected in levies  from their 
region, mandates to differentiate their research 
needs  and  a seat  on the  board  of the  Grape 
and Wine  Research and Development Corpo- 
ration,   these   associations would   deliver tai- 
lored   R&D extension  to  their   own   region. 
Such extension would  not only enhance a 
region’s innovative capacity but, again,  under- 
pin the identity and marketing of that region. 
It  was  also  the  type  of  extension that  was 
strongly  supported  by  survey   respondents. 
Of those  responding to  this  issue  (n = 92), 
87%  believed  that  the  current  R&D 
framework needs  to be significantly more 
regionalized. 
 
 
Marketing 
 
Marketing of Australia’s  wine  has  developed 
into  a contentious issue  in recent years,  par- 
ticularly in line  with  the  severity of the  wine 
surplus. Smaller  and medium-sized producers 
eager  to differentiate themselves in export 
markets are arguing for greater sophistication 
of the current marketing strategy. ‘Brand Aus- 
tralia’, it is argued, gives  the  impression that 
all  Australian   wine   comes   from  the   ‘same 
barrel’. This  campaign,  combined with   the 
most  common  geographic indicator — South 
East Australia — confirms  the industry’s repu- 
tation  for multi-region blending and  ambigu- 
ous product heritage. The South East Australia 
indicator covers  regions from the  Upper 
Hunter  in  New  South  Wales,   to  all  regions 
within Victoria and most in South Australia,  or 
approximately 1400  wineries across  three 
separate states. 
A more serious  issue is that ‘Brand Australia’ 
is now a 20-year-old advertising campaign. In 
fact, critics from Australia’s major market  — the 
UK — facetiously state that the image is ‘tired’ 
and could  be more appropriately relabelled as 
‘Bland   Australia’   (Heijbroek,  2006;    Henry, 
2006). These views  are reinforced by the 
survey’s respondents; 51% claimed that the 
campaign was  actually undermining their 
competitive  advantage  in   international 
markets. There is a strong  feeling  in the 
Australian   industry  that  the  re-launching  of 
‘Brand Australia’  in 2006  should have incorpo- 
rated  specific regional identities as an exten- 
sion of the national emblem. In its current 
format   it  fails  to  respond  to  sophisticated 
market  demands or highlight Australia’s  diver- 
sity in region, growth and production methods, 
and product heritage. In short, it is advertising 
a single-dimension brand in a multidimensional 
market. Organizationally, it is also reinforcing 
the industry’s path dependency in committing 
itself to production for, and supply to, a single- 
sector commodity market rather than adapting 
to the multifarious supply and demand  routes 
now  required. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Each of the above  initiatives of course under- 
lines the differentiated responses that the Aus- 
tralian   wine   industry must  adopt  if  it  is  to 
avoid being relegated to its supply status of the 
1970s.  After establishing its credentials for 
innovative foresight throughout the 1990s,  the 
industry allowed itself  to be captured by the 
interests of its largest  corporations. These cor- 
porations, justifiably for their own welfare, led 
the  industry into  a stable,  nationalized, path 
dependency.  It  was   a  path   dependency  in 
which new  production, R&D, distribution and 
marketing strategies were fitted  within the 
existing framework. The  world’s commodity 
markets had become the domain  of Australian 
wine  multinationals. Alternative routes  of 
product identification that  were emerging in 
Bordeaux, New  Zealand  and  California  were, 
and still are, perceived as a threat  to this 
framework. 
  
 
The  Australian  wine  industry faces  further 
depletion unless it can extricate itself from the 
‘iron  cage’  of commodification and  embrace 
the cultural leadership being  demonstrated by 
its most robust regional producers. There is no 
threat  to the  commodity market. There  is no 
threat  to Australia’s  ability  to develop young, 
fruit-driven, blended wine  for the world’s non- 
discriminating drinkers. There currently exists, 
however, a rapidly closing  window of oppor- 
tunity  for the industry to promote its differ- 
ences, its variety, its regionality and heritage, 
and perhaps most importantly, its ability  to 
produce fine wine. Only with  the cultural 
acceptance and promotion of parallel but dif- 
ferentiated wine sectors can the industry move 
towards true  maturity. 
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